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Explanation in Classical Population
Genetics
Anya Plutynski†‡
The recent literature in philosophy of biology has drawn attention to the different sorts
of explanations proffered in the biological sciences—we have molecular, biomedical,
and evolutionary explanations. Do these explanations all have a common structure or
relation that they seek to capture? This paper will answer in the negative. I defend a
pluralistic and pragmatic approach to explanation. Using examples from classical pop-
ulation genetics, I argue that formal demonstrations, and even strictly “mathematical
truths,” may serve as explanatory in different historical contexts.
1. Introduction. The topic of this symposium is the making of a theory—
in particular, the making of the “genetical” theory of evolution via the
early synthesis of Mendelian genetics with Darwinism in the work of
Fisher, Haldane, and Wright in the 1920s and 1930s. Scientific theories
are supposed to be about the world. Yet, classical population genetics is
a formal discipline treating not so much the world as possible worlds.
The simple one-locus, two-allele models of Fisher, Haldane and Wright
sweep aside the “disorderly complexity” of genetic interaction, develop-
ment and changing environments for the sake of the “meaningful sim-
plicity” of idealized relationships between population size and effects of
selection, mutation, and drift on distributions of gene frequency.1 Richard
Lewontin (2000) has called the achievements of classical population ge-
netics “minimal deductive programs,” purely analytic statements about
the interactive effects of population size, mutation, migration, etc. in pop-
†To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Utah,
260 S. Central Campus Drive, Orson Spencer Hall, Room 341, Salt Lake City, UT
84112; e-mail: plutynski@philosophy.utah.edu.
‡Thanks to my fellow symposiasts: Margaret Morrison, Sahotra Sarkar, and Rob
Skipper for joining, and to John Beatty for chairing. Thanks also to Kyle Stanford
for his questions and comments.
1. According to Herbert Simon, “The purpose of science is to find meaningful simplicity
in the midst of disorderly complexity” (cited in Crow 2001).
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ulations represented strictly in terms of allele frequencies. From the per-
spective of today’s advances in molecular and developmental biology, this
may seem a hollow achievement. One may well ask what value there is
in predicting the future state of an infinite population consisting of non-
interacting genes with single phenotypic effects, each assigned constant
selection coefficients, as there could be no such populations!
In part due to these sorts of ‘possible worlds’ explanations, classical
population genetics has been one of the more maligned subdisciplines of
biology. Punnett complained of Fisher’s 1918 groundbreaking paper, “On
the Correlation between Relatives on the Supposition of Mendelian In-
heritance,” that it treated of “weightless elephants on frictionless surfaces”
(Punnett, [1916] 1976). Ernst Mayr famously christened population ge-
netics “beanbag genetics”—insofar as it treats evolution as mere changes
in gene frequency, as if evolution were nothing more than the “adding
and removal of beans from a bag” (Mayr, 1959). And Will Provine writes
in the new afterward to his history of the Origins of Theoretical Population
Genetics:
In 1970 I could see the origins of theoretical population genetics as
being an unalloyed good for evolutionary biology, and thus obviously
a great subject for an historian. Now I see these same models of the
1930’s, still widely used today, as an impediment to the understanding
of evolutionary biology, and their amazing persistence in textbooks
and classrooms as a great topic for other historians. ([1971] 2001,
204)
How to explain this shift? According to Provine, classical population
genetics today does not so much improve as it impedes understanding of
evolution. Classical population genetics, in treating evolution as mere
change in gene frequency, is “reductionistic,” committed to genic selec-
tionism, or unabashedly dismissive of the significant factors of genetic
interaction and development, or so say some of its most ardent critics.
And yet, despite its beanbag idealism and reductionism, population
genetics, in the first twenty-five years of the twentieth century, changed
the face of biology, or so I will argue.2 Work by Haldane, Fisher, and
Wright gave biologists a reason to adopt a Darwinian worldview, and to
2. Some (Smocovitis, 1996) might question my historical claim here as follows. Perhaps
this was not a scientifically motivated shift so much as an ideological shift. Biologists
employed the rhetoric of synthesis, some say, for reasons having to do not with science
but politics. While I acknowledge that there were institutional and political forces at
work in the synthesis (see Cain 1994), I wish here to focus on the scientific contributions
of some of the early architects, where “scientific” is construed broadly so as to coun-
tenance formal and empirical science.
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view Darwinism and Mendelism as compatible and complimentary. How
was this possible? How could mathematical models that treat of (strictly
speaking) fictional states of affairs so alter the history of biology? How
can false models explain? My answer, in part, comes from examination
of the historical context, and in part, from a philosophical reconsideration
of the role of the formal sciences and of mathematical models in scientific
explanation.
First, a bit of historical context and a caveat. Haldane, Fisher, and
Wright saw themselves as providing a refutation of neo-Lamarckian, or-
thogenetic, and generally anti-Darwinian views. It is often forgotten that
at the time Haldane, Fisher, and Wright were beginning their scientific
careers, Darwinism (conceived as the commitment to natural selection
being a major cause in generating the diversity of life) was widely viewed
to be discredited by biologists both in Europe and the U.S. (see Bowler
1983). One of the first books Wright read as a student of biology, Kellogg’s
Darwinism To-day, holds that, “Darwinism, as the all-sufficient, or even
the most important causo-mechanical factor in species-forming and hence
as the sufficient explanation of descent, is discredited and cast down”
(1903, 374). When Fisher, Haldane, and Wright first began their project
of developing a mathematical biology, each of them was well aware of
this general concern, and so, had a common set of enemies. Using simple
mathematical models, they wished to demonstrate the compatibility of a
Mendelian system of inheritance and Darwinism, and the tenability of a
Darwinian research program. To the extent that they were successful, it
is incumbent upon historians and philosophers of science to address the
following questions:
1. How did Haldane, Fisher, and Wright achieve their aims?
2. More generally, how are idealized formal models such as those of
classical population genetics explanatory?
The object of this paper will be to respond to these questions. More
precisely, I will defend the following three theses. First, the standard ap-
proaches to the problem of scientific explanation are insufficient to ac-
count for the ways in which the formal models of classical population
genetics explain. Second, the best way of making sense of the role that
these models play in answering requests for explanation is appeal to van
Fraassen’s pragmatic approach. Third, some examples from classical pop-
ulation genetics may serve as a case in point for how the same model
may explain at several levels, or relative to several different contrast classes
that are salient in different historical contexts (van Fraassen 1980).
Let me first issue a caveat. I do not mean to suggest here that Haldane,
Fisher, and Wright single-handedly refuted the anti-Darwinians. Indeed,
as Beatty (1986) and others (Provine [1971] 2001) have pointed out, this
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shift occurred gradually and was the result of efforts of both an empirical
and a formal sort. I simply wish to claim here that the formal demon-
strations were explanatorily relevant to the refutation of anti-Darwinism.
2. Standard Approaches to Explanation. For Hempel (1965), the aim of
a philosophical theory of scientific explanation is normative; we are to
identify the structure and conditions of adequacy of a scientific expla-
nation. Once we have identified this common structure or set of conditions,
we may demarcate good from bad, scientific from nonscientific expla-
nations. Hempel’s solution to the problem was a family of deductive
models; according to Hempel, explanations are arguments with sets of
laws and initial conditions constituting the explanans, and facts or events
to be explained in the explananandum. On this account, explanations run
parallel with predictions.
However, the explanations made possible by appeal to the models of
population genetics do not run parallel with predictions; i.e., they are not
if-then arguments with specific facts or events in the consequent. Rather,
the explananda in population genetics are not facts or events in the world,
in the sense of propositions about what is the case. Rather, what is ex-
plained is what is possible, and what is necessary, given certain assump-
tions about the genetics of populations. Hempel may have called such
explanations explanation-sketches.
The other two “venerable traditions” of thinking about scientific ex-
planation take it that the aim of a philosophical theory of explanation is
not so much normative as descriptive. We are to look closely to the practice
of science and see what it is that all explanations in science share.3 On
the one hand, Salmon has defended the view that scientific explanations
provide information about the causal structure of the world (1984). On
the other hand, Kitcher defends the view that a scientific theory is ex-
planatory when it unifies several phenomena under a common framework,
or family of argument schemata (1989).
However, in my view, neither of these two traditions quite captures the
way in which mathematical models in biology provide explanatory in-
formation. First, with respect to the causal model, as Sober (1983) has
pointed out, equilibrium models such as Fisher’s sex-ratio model are not
causal per se, insofar as they do not identify specific causal factors at
work in any particular case of a population at equilibrium. Instead, equi-
librium models present us with disjunctions of possible causal scenarios.
Sober contends that giving the actual causal history of some population
may be less explanatory than a general demonstration of the sort Fisher
3. The expression is due to Railton (1981).
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provided. Indeed, he claims that “once an evolutionary model is stated
carefully, it often turns out to be a nonempirical mathematical truth”
(1999, 72). If mathematical truths are explanatory, then we certainly need
to rethink the causal model of explanation!
Second, the unificationist approach of Kitcher, while bringing out at-
tention to one important virtue of scientific explanation, does not cover
all cases. Sometimes scientists may wish for a causal explanation of some
particular facts or event. Sometimes they may wish to identify a class or
kind of event, or see a common pattern across disparate events. And
sometimes, they may wish for an explanation of what’s possible, given
some set of constraints. In these cases, what will count as an explanation
may consist of a mathematical demonstration or a proof of what must
be so, for any population that fits (ceteris paribus) the description the
model. In my view, the explanatory value of these sorts of mathematical
demonstrations has been all but ignored by philosophers of science (but
see Glymour 1980).
While I think that each of the several ways in which philosophers of
science have attempted to capture the explanatory relation is promising
in one or another context, it’s not clear that their identification of the
explanatory relation as one of causation, unification, or even the latest
candidates of invariance or stability, is sufficient to account for the several
ways in which scientists explain. Indeed, I think it’s a mistake to look for
one virtue in which scientific explanations are explanatory—either in iden-
tifying the cause, relation of stability or invariance, or what have you.
Philosophers of science have, I think, been mistaken in seeking out the
relation in virtue of which scientific explanations explain. So, while the
pluralist approach would certainly be unsatisfying if what we are looking
for is a solution to Hempel’s problem, it seems that it is unavoidable if
what we are in search of it a descriptively adequate account of scientific
explanation.
3. An Alternative Approach. In this section I will defend a pluralistic and
pragmatic approach to scientific explanation, one which I believe to be
more adequate to scientific practice. One way of understanding explan-
atory pluralism is the following. Scientific understanding admits of kinds
and degrees. Once we grant that there are many types of scientific un-
derstanding, perhaps we ought also to grant that there are many types
and virtues of scientific explanations. I take Salmon (1990) to have de-
fended a view akin to this when he claimed that scientific explanations
may satisfy two sorts of desires for understanding: gaining a unified world-
view, or Weltanschauung, and opening the black box and finding out how
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things work.4 Salmon seems to have gone some way towards supporting
the view here that the enterprise of explaining in the sciences is not a
single kind of activity.
The explanatory role of models and mathematical demonstration in
biology is not restricted to demonstrating how a change in one variable
yields a change in another. There is another class of explanations that
draw upon mathematical modeling that is worth examining. Sometimes,
a scientific community may wish to know why we ought to adopt this
research program rather than another, or whether two research programs
are compatible. In service of answering these latter sorts of questions,
scientists may make appeal to formal mathematical demonstrations, or
proofs of possibility. Whether or how such a demonstration is explanatory
will depend importantly on the historical context.
Van Fraassen’s (1980) account of the pragmatics of explanation serves
as a systematic framework for making this last point. According to van
Fraassen, theories of explanation have mistakenly been understood to be
two-term relations between theory and fact, when indeed they are three-
term relations between theory, fact, and context:
Being an explanation is essentially relative, for an explanation is an
answer. Since an explanation is an answer, it is evaluated vis-a-vis a
question, which is a request for information. But exactly what is
requested differs from context to context. . . . the background theory
plus data relative to which the question is evaluated as arising or not
arising, depends on the context. . . . And, even what part of that
background information is to be used to evaluate how good the
answer is, qua answer to that question, is a contextually determined
factor. (van Fraassen 1980, 153)
I take van Fraassen’s point in the above passage to be the following.
Historical context and the interests of the questioner will determine what
counts as an interesting and important question, and relatedly, what
4. Another respect in which one may be a pluralist about scientific explanation is to
suggest that one event can be correctly explained in two ways (Grantham 1999). I will
not be defending this view here.
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counts as good answer.5 I think that this general point may help us make
sense of Provine’s claim above that the development of classical popu-
lation genetics, while once apparently an unalloyed good for evolutionary
biology, today seems an impediment to understanding. At an early stage
in some science, our background theory plus data may lead us to conclude
that we have two different research programs that are intrinsically at odds
with one another. So, whether it is possible that known data accounted
for on one hypothesis could be accounted for on another may be a ques-
tion of great import. Such questions as “How is it possible that this could
come about?” or “How can we conceive of these two theories or hy-
potheses as compatible?” are not insignificant questions at certain stages
of scientific inquiry. Constructing models is one very effective way of
answering these sorts of questions. Moreover, the same demonstration
may answer two requests for explanation simultaneously; such demon-
strations may both explain how it is possible that known phenomena
could be accounted for on this or that theory, and why we may have good
reason to adopt a new research program that takes such a theory as
central. Of course, whether we regard such demonstrations as explanatory
in these ways is importantly contingent upon historical context.
4. Cases in Point. Let us turn to two examples from the history of classical
population genetics that serve as cases in point. The first is drawn from
Fisher’s 1918 paper, “The Correlation between Relatives on the Suppo-
sition of a Mendelian Inheritance,” and the second is drawn from Hal-
dane’s 1924 paper, “A Mathematical Theory of Artificial and Natural
Selection.” Each of these simultaneously answered specific how-possibly
questions, but also offered proofs of possibility, on the one hand, of the
compatibility of Darwinism with a Mendelian theory of inheritance, and
on the other, of the possibility of relatively weak selection generating
significant change in a short amount of evolutionary time. Moreover, the
5. While one may be moved by Kitcher and Salmon’s (1987) objection here that this
view may seem to countenance an “anything goes” stance on explanation, according
to which there may be no objective standards for what counts as explanatory, Lloyd
and Anderson (1993) and Richardson (1992) have pointed out that van Fraassen has
a reply to such objections, even if to some it may sound like a slippery one. Roughly,
his answer is that what we may rule out as nonscientific will depend upon our best
science. While this may seem unsatisfactory for one who thinks that for an explanation
to be scientific it must be true, if my examples are any guide, it seems that possibility
and not only truth is of interest to scientists. I agree with van Fraassen that an answer
to what sorts of explanations count as explanatory is not a question that philosophers
may expect to answer a priori, but that the answer to this question will depend im-
portantly on the scientific community’s standards, their background theories, etc. (But
see also Woody 2004.)
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demonstrations both rested on, strictly speaking, false assumptions, and
the conclusion, at least in Fisher’s case, depended entirely upon his pre-
suppositions. Formal mathematical demonstrations of this sort, I wish to
argue, are explanatory in that they are effective at providing proofs of
possibility. Sober has said that our evolutionary models often provide,
strictly speaking, arguments where, once all the premises are set out, the
conclusion follows necessarily; they are, he says, “mathematical truths.”
How can these mathematical truths be explanatory? Here is how.
Fisher’s 1918 paper is an attempt to demonstrate how a multifactorial
theory of inheritance can serve to underpin observed correlations between
relatives discovered through biometrical methods. Thus it is widely re-
garded as the seminal paper which successfully synthesized two hitherto
distinct and opposing schools on the science of heredity and evolution,
biometry and Mendelism. For our purposes, we can take the results of
biometry to be the following; the vast majority of continuous traits (height,
weight) exhibit a normal distribution, or if not, can be broken down into
sums of two or more normal distributions. Correlations between relatives
may be established, and these correlations decrease geometrically relative
to ancestors. The biometricians had done exhaustive measurements of a
range of continuous traits and found quantitative correlations between
relatives for human height, weight, length of forearm, etc. Moreover, they
were Darwinians in the classical sense; they believed that evolution was
gradual, or that small selective effects of minute variations already present
in natural populations were sufficient to explain the diversity of life we
see today. In contrast, the Mendelians, who tended to study distinct var-
iations that behaved in a Mendelian fashion (complete dominance, in-
dependent assortment, Mendelian ratios, etc.), held that evolution must
take place via major transitions. For example, de Vries believed that
mutations of large effect generated entirely new species. Fisher’s ostensive
project was to demonstrate that, given a number of assumptions, the
observed correlations between various pairs of relatives, father-son,
cousin, and siblings, among others, can be explained on the presupposition
that traits such as height are derivative from a multitude of Mendelian,
or discrete, independent factors. His more general goal was to demonstrate
the compatibility of biometry and the Darwinian perspective with Men-
delism; i.e., that the gradualist picture of evolution was not antithetical
to the new particulate theory of inheritance, as many believed.
As with almost all of Fisher’s theoretical work, his assumptions were
idealized and crucial to his conclusions.6 What made his demonstration
6. However, his analysis of the correlation was not wholly idealized; he successively
dealt with a number of realistic biological complications: complete or partial recessivity,
multiple alleles, epistacy, linkage, and assortative mating. He showed that with each
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possible was that he relaxed some of the assumptions that others were
unwilling to give up. This is exactly what Fisher meant when he wrote in
the first lines of the paper that “it is here attempted to ascertain the
biometrical properties of a population of more general type than had
hitherto been examined.” In particular, he assumed that dominance was
not complete, but that the heterozygote could be at any point intermediate
between homozygotes. Fisher also assumed that the relevant Mendelian
factors were entirely independent in their effect, and that the number and
effects of such factors affecting any particular trait was quite large. Start-
ing with these assumptions, he showed how a normal distribution of
measurements of some trait may follow from a particulate scheme of
inheritance.
Let us follow Fisher’s reasoning. First, he comments on the fact that
the correlations found between relatives when Pearson and Yule earlier
attempted to follow through with the consequences of a particulate theory
were too small, in part resulting from their assumptions of complete dom-
inance. Fisher suggests that we relax this assumption, and suggests al-
ternatively that we assume that dominance is not absolute, but that the
heterozygote may occupy an intermediate state between homozygotes.
Next, he asks us to suppose that the measurement of some trait is the
sum of the effects of a large number of independent factors. If the factors
underpinning a trait were sufficiently numerous, acted independently, and
were minute in their effects, then they would yield a normal distribution.
This follows necessarily from the central limit theorem. As Moran and
Smith have written:
The fact that the distribution of the sum of all factors will be ap-
proximately normally distributed will follow from a version of the
Central Limit theorem, which proves asymptotic normality for a sum
of independent random variables each of which is “individually neg-
ligible” in their effects. (1966, 6)
By ignoring complications such as the extent and nature of dominance,
whether the “factors were coupled” (whether there was linkage of genes
on the chromosome), as well as preferential mating, selection, and effects
of the environment, Fisher arrives at the normal distribution. He later
commented that his method here was analogous to that of Maxwell in
deriving the velocity distribution of molecules in a gas:
added complication, the correlation between relatives remained compatible with the
empirical results of the biometricians. This paper illustrates Fisher’s persistent method
of beginning with a great deal of abstraction, and then gradually showing how, even
with the added complication of biological reality, the effects still “average out.”
1210 ANYA PLUTYNSKI
the whole investigation may be compared to the analytical treatment
of the Theory of Gases, in which it is possible to make the most
varied assumptions as to the accidental circumstances, and even the
essential nature of the individual molecules, and yet to develop the
general laws as to the behavior of gases, leaving but a few funda-
mental constants to be determined by experiment. (1922, 331–332).
Maxwell assumed for the theory of gases that the molecules of a gas are
numerous, minute, perfectly elastic, and have no interactive effects. Anal-
ogously, Fisher assumes for his genetical theory that the hereditary factors
were sufficiently numerous, acted independently and were minute in their
effects.
However, the power of Fisher’s demonstration of the compatibility of
biometry with the particulate theory did not end with the demonstration
that a normal distribution followed from the assumptions mentioned. He
used the analysis of variance to partition the causes of variation in a trait
into dominance and additive components. Next, he demonstrated how
the additive component of the variance contributed to the correlation
between relatives. Thus, he showed how, on a particulate theory, the
correlations between relatives were approximately those given by the
biometricians, and these correlations could be due to the additive com-
ponent of the variance.7 What Fisher did was not so much add to the
number of facts explained as reconceive the object of explanation. A
population of organisms was, in a sense, reduced to a cloud of points
with no interactive forces and independent actions. The normal distri-
bution and the correlations between relatives followed from these as-
sumptions. Fisher thus showed how a very attenuated sense of Mendelism
was compatible with the results of biometry.
Fisher’s demonstration answered two “how possibly” questions simul-
taneously: How is it possible that the known correlations between relatives
could be determined by discrete genetic factors? And, how is Darwinism
compatible with Mendelism? This example can help us make sense of
Sober’s claim mentioned above that many of the mathematical models in
evolutionary biology are, once examined closely, nonempirical mathe-
matical truths, but are nonetheless explanatory. Often, following through
the mathematical consequences of one’s assumptions can be explanatory
insofar as one shows how something is possible, given some set of
suppositions.
Similarly, the mathematical demonstrations of Haldane in his 1924
paper of the effectiveness of small selection coefficients over a relatively
short amount of time serve as a second case in point of how a model
7. See Appendix for a demonstration.
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provides explanatory information of a “how possibly” sort. His mathe-
matical demonstration of how, given an initial set of conditions, selection
affects the distribution of alleles in a population both explained the effects
of selection in a diploid population and showed why it is not implausible
that selection can generate significant change over a short span of “geo-
logical” time. Note that his explanandum here was not some fact or event,
such as the evolution of the vertebrate limb. Rather, he was simply de-
scribing the mathematical consequences of a small selection coefficient on
the distribution of genes in a population over time—essentially deriving
a logistic curve.
The cases above serve as evidence for my pluralist and pragmatist thesis.
A mathematical demonstration may serve to address both more specific
as well as general concerns simultaneously. The same mathematical model
can provide explanatory information about how two theoretical frame-
works are related and about whether we ought to adopt this or that
research program. We are mistaken when we look to classical population
genetics exclusively to explain particular events or states of affairs in the
world. It’s better to view population genetics as either providing expla-
nations of classes of events or processes, or providing proofs of possibility.
Thus, there are several virtues in which a theory or model may serve as
explanatory; it may provide us with a novel Weltanschauung, or “open
up the black box,” or it may provide us with demonstrations of possi-
bilities. Such proofs may be of great relevance at certain stages in science.
Today, with the vast amount of empirical evidence of the effectiveness of
selection (see, e.g., Endler 1986) we may well be unimpressed by Haldane’s
demonstration. However, in 1924, it was quite significant. I think that an
appeal to the context sensitivity of requests for explanation can help us
make sense of Provine’s comment cited above. He was correct in 1970
that the development of classical population genetics was an unalloyed
good for evolutionary biology, and he may well be right that today it
impedes understanding.
Appendix: The Correlation between Relatives
Fisher’s own demonstration that the correlations between relatives found
by biometricians was explainable on the supposition of a Mendelian or
particulate scheme of inheritance is too technically difficult to explain
here. I derive the following mathematical demonstration from Ewens’s
(1979).
Consider a trait that is determined entirely by a locus with two alleles,
A1 and A2. Suppose that all A1A1 individuals have measurement m11 for
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TABLE 1.
GENOTYPE:
FATHER
SON
Phenotype A1A1 A1A2 A2A2
A1A1 m11 x
3 2x (1 x) 0
A1A2 m12
2x (1 x) x(1 x) 2x(1 x)
A2A2 m22 0
2x(1 x) 3(1 x)
the character, and all A1A2 have measurement m12, etc. Let us assume
no environmental contributions to expression of the phenotype.
Suppose random mating obtains, such that the frequencies of A1A1,
A1A2, and A2A2 are x2, , and . The mean value of the22x(1 x) (1 x)
measurement of this trait will then be:
2 2Mp x m  2x(1 x)m  (1 x) m .11 12 22
And the variance will be:
2 2 2 2 2j p x (m M ) 2x(1 x)(m M )  (1 x) (m M ) .11 12 22
What is the covariance between father and son for the measurement
of this trait? Suppose the father is A1A1. The son will be either A1A1
with probability x or A1A2 with probability ( ). The father is A1A11 x
with probability x2. It is possible to draw up a table of the probabilities
of various father-son combinations (see table 1). The covariance between
the father and son is thus:
3 2 2 2 2x m  2x (1 x)m m  x(1 x)m  2x(1 x) m m11 11 12 12 12 22
2 2 2 (1 x)3m M p x(1 x){xm  (1 2x)m  (1 x)m } .22 11 12 22
The correlation between the two measurements is found by dividing
the covariance by the variance:
2 2x(1 x){xm  (1 2x)m  (1 x)m } /j .11 12 22
Here it will be useful to introduce two new concepts, additive and
dominance variance. Let the total variance j2 be made up of two com-
ponents, the additive and nonadditive:
2 2j p 2x(1 x){xm  (1 2x)m  (1 x)m } ,A 11 12 22
2 2 2 2j p x (1 x) {2m m m } .D 12 11 22
One can see that the total variance in the measurement of a trait is a sum
of the additive and dominance variance. The genic or additive variance
is that part of the total variance in a character which can be accounted
for by the average effect of the substitution of the A1 allele for the A2
allele at the locus. (Fisher used a least squares method in order to dem-
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onstrate average effect of substitution of an allele. I will not describe the
method here, as it involves some tricky mathematics.) Suffice it to say
that we can partition the variance in the measurement of a trait into two
parts, the additive and the dominance, or residual variance. The residual
variance describes the excess in the case that the heterozygote is not in-
termediate between each homozygote. Or, it is just that part of the variance
in excess of the additive, when:
1m does not exactly equal (m m ).12 11 222
The expression above for the covariance may thus be rewritten as follows:
1 2 2j /j .A2
Thus, the above demonstrates that the correlation between father and son
will be half the ratio of the additive genetic variance to the total variance,
or approximately . Considering the case of full sibs, we get a corre-12
lation of approximately the ratio of dominance variance to total1 12 4
variance (thus accounting for the higher correlation between sibs),
for uncle and nephew, and dominance to total1 1 12 2 2 2 2 2j /j j /j  j /jA A D4 4 6
variance for double first cousins. Subsequent to the above demonstration,
Fisher showed that with the added complication of many loci, as well as
assortative mating, approximately the same correlations hold. Recall that
Fisher assumed that there were no effects of environment, and no cor-
relation in environment between father and son.
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